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The purpose of this research was to investigate whether metacognitive judgments for 
prospective memory (PM; also called Judgments of Intention - JOIs) differ from 
judgments of learning (JOLs). Specifically, this researcher tested whether JOIs 
exhibit the “delayed-JOL effect”, in which JOLs made at a delay following study are 
more accurate predictors of performance than JOLs made immediately following 
study. Results from the first two experiments showed no delayed-JOI effect. In 
Experiments 3 – 5 a time-based paradigm was used to investigate whether the type of 
judgment prompt might explain this lack of delayed JOI effect. Results suggest that 
participants are able to make moderately accurate predictions of prospective memory 
(PM) performance and that delayed JOIs may be more accurate than immediate JOIs 
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How do Judgments of Intention (JOIs) differ from 
Judgments of Learning (JOLs)? 
Imagine that you have the task of returning a video to the rental store on your way 
to work tomorrow morning. You judge whether or not you’ll remember, and based on 
your judgment either create an external reminder (e.g. write yourself a note), create an 
internal reminder (e.g., “Seeing the VCR before I walk out the door in the morning 
will prompt me to remember the video task”) or choose not to create an explicit 
reminder (e.g. “I don’t need a reminder; I’ll remember to take the video back.”). 
The video task is a prospective memory (PM) task, or a memory for an intention 
to do something in the future. Predicting whether or not you will remember it is an 
example of metacognitive monitoring, while choosing a cue is an example of 
employing a memory strategy which may or may not improve your chance of 
performing the task. This paper focuses on the monitoring aspect of the memory task 
(i.e. people’s accuracy at predicting whether or not they will remember to do a PM 
task), although the factors one considers when deciding whether to construct a 
reminder and the type of reminder one chooses are also important aspects of 
prospective memory. 
Though begun in the 1970’s by Meacham and Singer (1977), investigation of PM 
phenomena lacked a laboratory paradigm until Einstein and McDaniel introduced one 
in 1990. In Einstein and McDaniel’s experiment, college-age and elderly participants 
studied short lists of target nouns. Then the targets were interspersed among other 
nouns as part of a short term memory (STM) task in which participants were asked to 




a target (which appeared relatively infrequently) occurred on the STM list. Results 
showed that younger participants performed better than older participants on the STM 
task, but there were no age differences on the PM task. Use of an external memory 
aid improved performance on the PM task for both groups. 
Since the adoption of this paradigm, research has shown that carrying out an 
event-based PM task typically produces declines in performance on the on-going task, 
even on trials in which no PM target appears (e.g., Smith, 2003; however, note that in 
some PM experiments, the decline in performance on the on-going task is 
necessitated by the paradigm because of a pause or stop in the on-going task to allow 
for the PM task to be carried out), and that performance on PM tasks tends to decline 
as the complexity of the PM task increases (Marsh, Hancock & Hicks, 2002). 
Additionally, there are age-related performance decrements for some PM tasks but 
not others (Maylor, Smith, Della Sala & Logie, 2002; Vogels, Dekker, Brouwer & 
DeJong, 2002), and among those with suspected memory impairment, more valuable 
objects (e.g., a wallet) required an equivalent number of cues to prompt retrieval as 
less valuable objects (e.g., a pen; Reese & Cherry, 2002). 
Only a few studies of PM have investigated any metacognitive aspect, but Cohen, 
Dixon, Lindsay, Dixon & Masson (2003) have speculated that participants may use 
metacognitive monitoring to pace their progress through a PM task and allocate 
attention to the different aspects of the task. Clinical studies have shown that self-
rated memory self-efficacy is a significant predictor of performance on a PM task 
(McDonald-Miszczak, Gould & Tychynski, 1999). Respondents with traumatic brain 




those of normal controls, but close friends and relatives rated the patients’ failures as 
comparatively more frequent (Roche, Fleming & Shum, 2002).  
To date, no published literature has examined whether learners are able to use 
item-by-item metacognitive judgments, such as Judgments of Learning (JOLs) to 
discriminate between PM tasks that they will vs. will not remember to do. This may 
be due in part to some important difference in the traditional JOL paradigm and the 
paradigm for PM tasks. Investigation of JOLs typically includes a phase in which 
learners study pairs of items (e.g., OCEAN – TREE) and are then shown the first item 
in the pair and asked to make a judgment (either immediately or at some delay) about 
how likely they are to remember the second item when cued with the first on a later 
test (e.g., “How confident are you that in about ten minutes from now you will be 
able to recall the second word when prompted with the first (0 = definitely won’t 
recall, 20 = 20% sure, 40..., 60..., 80..., 100 = definitely will recall?)”. After 
judgments have been made for all items, there is usually a criterion test against which 
the metacognitive judgments can be compared. 
The paradigm for PM is similar to that for JOLs in that it typically has a learning 
phase and a criterion test. However, the PM test typically occurs in the context of 
some other on-going activity (often a STM task) during which the PM cues occur 
relatively infrequently. Predictive judgments could easily be included in a PM 
paradigm by inserting them between the study phase and the criterion test, but with an 
important difference: participants would not be asked to monitor their performance on 
a single task (as in the classic JOL paradigm), but rather on a task with two 




PM to include recognition, verification, retrieval of the response and coordination of 
the PM response with any on-going activity (Cohen, Dixon, Lindsay, Dixon & 
Masson, 2003)]. Successful PM performance involves both recognition that a cue has 
occurred, and recall of the action the cue was meant to prompt (though of course one 
might have successful recall even if the cue does not occur or one fails to recognize 
the cue, though presumably some other cue has served in it’s place to indicate the 
need to recall the task).  
To include metacognitive judgments in a PM experiment, one might use paired-
associate items in which the first item in the pair is meant to act as the recognition cue 
and the second item in the pair is meant to be recalled. Participants would be asked to 
study these target pairs so that they could recall the second item in the pair when 
prompted with the first, but also so that they would recognize the first item in the pair 
as a recognition target. The prompt for the judgment would be different from those 
used for JOLs, as the criterion test would be different. Instead of asking a participant 
how likely he or she would be to recall the second item in a pair when prompted with 
the first, one might instead ask the participate to rate his or her confidence that he or 
she would be able to recognize the first item as a cue and respond by recalling the 
second item in the pair. At test, the first items in the target pairs would appear during 
another on-going task (e.g., recall of short lists of words). The criterion for correct 
performance on the PM task would be to recognize a word presented on in a STM list 
as having comprised the first item from one of the studied paired-associates and 




paradigm between metacognitive judgments made for recall of paired associates and 
those made for PM. 
A central question of this paper is whether learners can use metamemory 
judgments to predict performance on a PM task. In addition to the accuracy of 
predictions, this research also investigates other ways in which judgments about 
performance on a PM task might be like traditional JOLs, and thus also asks whether 
they exhibit the “delayed-JOL effect”, in which delayed JOLs are more accurate 
predictors of recall performance than are immediate JOLs (Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991). I chose this established empirical effect to determine the ways these judgments 
might differ from those made for traditional paired-associate learning predictions. 
This effect seems like an ideal phenomenon to investigate the similarities between the 
two types of judgments as it is a robust and easily-produced phenomenon in the 
context of a paired-associate learning task. 
Some theories in the literature offer explanations for the delayed-JOL effect. 
Spellman & Bjork (1992) speculated that the delayed-JOL effect might be caused by 
the delayed judgment acting as a spaced study trial, which would be expected to boost 
recall for items that are retrievable at the time of judgment. Nelson and Dunlosky 
(1992) countered that if this was the case, we should expect to see better recall 
performance for items given delayed JOLs than those given immediate JOLs, which 
not only does not always obtain, but occasionally reverses (i.e. recall performance is 
sometimes better for items given immediate JOLs). They proposed instead the 
Monitoring Dual Memories (MDM) hypothesis, which states that both short-term and 




difficulty in making accurate judgments, as one cannot distinguish whether an item is 
retrievable because it has been stored in long-term memory or because it is still active 
in short-term memory. However, when making a delayed JOL, sufficient time has 
passed that only long-term memory is accessible, making it easier for one to 
determine whether an item resides there in memory. 
A series of experiments was designed to determine whether people can make 
accurate PM predictions. In the first experiment, participants made Judgments of 
Intention (JOIs, i.e., JOLs for PM) as if the PM task was a unitary task (i.e., not 
composed of a recognition and recall aspect). In the second experiment, participants 
were asked to make both JOLs and JOIs and were asked to make their judgments 
about either the recall aspect of the task, the recognition aspect of the task, or the 
entire PM task. In the third through fifth experiment, I used a time-based paradigm to 
investigate whether the type of judgment prompt might explain the results of the first 
two experiments.  
The first study is designed to investigate whether learners are able to 
accurately monitor PM when asked to monitor recognition and recall as a unitary task 
(i.e., both the recognition and the recall aspect are conceptualized and explained to 
participants as a single “step”). Because both JOLs and JOIs share a recall aspect in 
the criterion test, it seemed reasonable to predict a delayed JOL effect for both types 
of judgments, even if participants are less accurate at monitoring the recognition 
aspect of the task. However, because JOLs for a paired-associate learning task are 
less than perfectly accurate in predicting recall performance, especially when made 




would be very surprising if JOIs exceeded the level of accuracy usually observed for 
JOLs (gamma correlations of .30-.40 for immediate JOLs and .70-.90+ for delayed 
JOLs), as participants are being asked to judge a more complex memory task that 
occurs in the context of an on-going STM task.  
The explanations for delayed-JOL effect also have some bearing on the 
hypotheses for this experiment. If Spellman and Bjork are correct in saying that 
delayed judgments create a recall boost for items that are retrievable at the time of 
judgment, we would expect to see better PM performance for items given delayed 
judgments. The MDM hypothesis, however, predicts no difference in PM 
performance based on the timing of the judgments. 
Additionally, Experiment 1 manipulates the length of the on-going STM task 
to determine whether longer on-going tasks cause a decline in PM performance. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-four students in a senior level psychology course at the 
University of Maryland participated as part of a course requirement. 
Design. This experiment used a mixed-factors design with timing of judgment 
(immediate or delayed) manipulated between subjects and length of the on-going 
STM trial (three or six words) manipulated within subjects. Length of STM trial was 
randomized. 
Procedure. Participants were given both written and oral instructions before 
participating in the experiment. Ten paired associates (e.g. BREAD – J) were 




pairs so that they would be able to respond with the letter if they saw the noun on the 
later test.  
Either immediately after the offset of the learning trial (immediate JOI condition) 
or after a 30-second filled delay (delayed JOI condition), participants were prompted 
with the first item in each pair and asked to make their JOI with the following 
question, “How confident are you that in about ten minutes from now you will be able 
to respond with the letter when you see the word (0 = definitely won’t complete the 
PM task, 20 = 20% sure, 40..., 60..., 80..., 100 = definitely will complete the PM 
task)?". It was specified in the instructions that they should judge the entire task (i.e., 
both recognition and recall). At the offset of the learning and judgment phase, 
participants engaged in a brief distracter task which took them about 10 minutes.  
During the test phase, participants were shown 20 lists of nouns, each three or six 
words long, at a two-second rate. They were asked to study each list so that they 
could remember all the nouns in each list. If, during a the presentation of a list, they 
recognized one of the cues from the learning phase, they were instructed to press the 
key representing the letter associated with the word (e.g. if “BREAD” was present in 
the list, they were to press the letter “J”). Half of the lists contained cues from the 
learning phase. No more than one cue appeared during any list and the cue was never 
the last word in any trial. At the end of each STM trial participants were prompted to 
record the words in the list with the cue “????”. Participants were permitted to make 
their PM response any time during the presentation of the STM list until they were 
cued to recall the list. After they were prompted for STM recall, they were no longer 




 A distracter between learning and recall contained 10 multiple-choice 
questions about personal preferences. This task was self-paced. Questions were 
displayed on the computer monitor and participants input their responses on the 
keyboard. 
Materials. The PM learning lists contained paired associates composed of a noun 
and a letter which was neither the first nor last letter of the noun. Each PM list 
contained 10 paired associates. 
 The STM lists each contained 3 or 6 concrete nouns. Half contained cue 
words from the learning list. Participants recalled their answers on a lined sheet of 
paper. Responses to the PM task were made on the keyboard and recorded by the 
computer. 
Results 
 Proportion correct (and standard errors) for PM and STM performance are 
reported in Table 1. 
 PM performance. Performance on the PM task was scored as “correct” if the 
participant pressed the correct key in the trial in which the PM cue appeared. An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on number of correct PM responses showed no 
significant main effect of JOI timing (immediate or delayed), F(1, 32) = 2.68, p> .10, 
or length of the STM trial,  F(1, 32) = .28, p> .10, on PM performance. The 
interaction was also not significant, F(1, 32) = .08, p> .10.  
 STM performance. Performance on the STM task was scored as “correct” if 
the participant wrote down the correct word in the order it appeared in the list. An 




JOI timing (immediate or delayed) on STM performance for trials with PM targets, 
F(1, 32) = .77, p> .10, or for trials without PM targets, F(1, 32) = .60, p> .10. 
However, there was an effect of length of the STM trial for trials with PM targets, 
F(1, 32) =  63.13, p< .05, and for trials without PM targets, F(1, 32) = 120.58, p< .05. 
Participants performed better on trials with three items than those with six. The JOL 
timing by list length interaction was not significant either for target trials, F(1, 32) = 
.13, p> .10 or trials without targets, F(1, 32) = 1.27, p> .10. 
 Predictive accuracy of JOIs. Gamma correlations were computed between 
JOIs and PM performance for each participant for both immediate and delayed JOIs. 
A t-test showed no significant difference in predictive accuracy between immediate 
and delayed JOIs, t(23) = .95, p> .10, with a mean gamma of γ = .37 for items given 
immediate JOIs and γ =.36 for items given delayed JOIs1. 
Discussion 
The finding that delayed JOIs were not more accurate than immediate JOIs 
may be because participants are unable to accurately monitor recognition, recall, or 
because they are unable to predict performance that occurs in the context of another 
on-going task. The lack of a “delayed JOI effect” cannot be attributed to any 
difference in performance, as performance on the perspective memory task did not 
differ as a function JOI timing nor as a function of the length of the STM task. 
However, because it cannot be determined from the data from the first experiment 
what caused the lack of delayed JOI effect, a second experiment was designed to 
examine one possible basis for the finding, namely that participants were unable to 




Although no delayed-JOI effect obtained, it is important to note that there was 
no difference in PM performance for item given immediate as compared to delayed 
judgments. This provides evidence for the MDM explanation of delayed-JOL effect 
and suggests that merely making delayed judgments is not sufficient to improve 
performance. The JOIs themselves may be useful in determining which items need 
further study or other reminders in order for the intentions to be carried out, but there 
is no advantage in this case of making the JOIs at a delay. 
Experiment 2 
 The goal of the second experiment was to determine which of the differences 
between the classic JOL paradigm and the new JOI paradigm contributed to the lack 
of a delayed-JOI effect. Specifically, I designed this experiment to determine whether 
monitoring the recognition aspect of the task or the combined PM task was 
sufficiently different from monitoring a recall-only task to eliminate the increased 
accuracy for delayed judgments. Participants were asked to give judgments either 
about their performance on the recognition aspect, the recall aspect, or the combined 
PM task. 
Previous studies have assessed the separated recognition and recall components of 
the PM task (e.g., Cohen, Dixon, Lindsay, Dixon & Masson, 2003). This is the first 
study in which participants were asked to make judgments about both aspects of the 
task. 
Method  
Participants. Thirty-nine students in a senior level psychology course at the 




Design. This experiment used a mixed-factors design with the criterion test for 
which the judgment was made (recognition, recall or both) manipulated within 
subjects and timing of judgment (immediate or delayed) manipulated between 
subjects. The nature of the criterion test varied over blocks. Thus participants studied, 
made JOIs and were tested on items of one JOI-type and then repeated the sequence 
for the other JOIs types. Order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure.  Participants were instructed to learn paired associates as in the 
previous experiment. JOIs followed the same procedure as previously described with 
one exception: participants were asked to predict either their performance on the 
recognition aspect of the task, the recall aspect of the task, or their successful 
completion of the entire PM task. The cue for recognition memory JOIs was, “How 
likely are you to remember to push the spacebar to indicate that you recognize this 
word as a cue?” The cue for recall task JOIs was, “How likely are you to recall the 
task that was associated with the cue?” The cue for JOIs made for the combined PM 
JOIs was, “How likely are you to both remember to push the spacebar to indicate that 
you recognize this word as a cue AND recall the task that was associated with the 
cue?” For all judgments, participants were asked to respond on a scale from 0% to 
100%, where 0% perfect confidence that they will not remember the item and 100% 
represents perfect confidence that they will remember the item. 
The test phase was the same for all conditions regardless of the type of JOI. It was 
identical to that in the first experiment except that participants were instructed to 




were asked at the end of the STM trial to recall the letter that was paired with the 
noun, even if they did not recognize the item as a PM cue. 
Half of the STM lists contained PM cues, with no more than one cue appearing on 
any trial. Order of the presentation of the items in the STM trials was random, with 
the exception that PM targets did not appear in the last or penultimate position.  
Materials. The learning lists contained paired associates composed of a noun and 
a letter which was neither the first nor last letter of the noun. Each PM list contained 
10 paired associates. 
 A short distracter between study and test occurred for all three JOI conditions. 
The STM recall list contained short lists of concrete nouns. Half of these lists 
contained one cue word from the learning list. Participants recalled their answers on a 
lined sheet of paper. Responses to the PM task were made on the keyboard and 
recorded by the computer. 
Results 
 As proportion correct recognition, recall, PM performance and STM 
performance have no direct bearing on the accuracy of PM predictions and did not, in 
Experiment 1, show a pattern of results relevant to the experimental question, they are 
not reported here.  
 Predictive accuracy of JOIs. I computed gamma correlations between JOIs 
and PM performance for each participant for both immediate and delayed JOIs for 
each type of JOI and aspect of PM performance (see Table 2). 
 T-tests revealed no significant effect of delay for the gammas between JOI 




recognition. In fact, the gamma values of .31 and .37 are very close to those observed 
in the first experiment (which were γ = .37 and γ = .36 for immediate and delayed 
JOIs, respectively). 
There was a classic delayed JOL effect for the gammas between JOI and 
recall in the condition in which participants monitored recall. This is the condition in 
which the judgments most closely matched the traditional JOL paradigm.  
There was also a significant difference in predictive ability for immediate 
versus delayed JOIs for the gammas between JOIs and PM performance in the 
condition in which participants were asked to monitor PM. However, this outcome is 
difficult to interpret because the gammas are out of the range usually observed for 
immediate (.30-.40) and delayed (.70-.90+) JOLs.  
Discussion 
 It is difficult to draw conclusions based on the first two experiments, 
especially since a small number of data points contributed to the gamma correlation 
for each participant. The evidence so far does not distinguish whether monitoring the 
recognition aspect or monitoring the recall aspect leads to difficulty in monitoring the 
PM task. 
 Although Thiede & Dunlosky (1994) showed a delayed-JOL effect for 
recognition, they used paired-associates tested during 10AFC recognition in which 
the correct recognition target appeared as a choice on every test trial, while this JOI 
paradigm employs embedded single-item recognition in which the recognition cue 




that used in the first two experiments both because the cue for the JOL was different 
and because the recognition test was not embedded in a STM task. 
Additionally, T. Nelson (personal communication, February 11, 2004) 
suggested that one explanation of why the predictive accuracy of recognition JOIs 
does not improve with a delay between study and judgment may be that the cue used 
is not sufficient to provide the insight into memory that produces the delayed JOL 
effect. 
 A study by Nelson & Dunlosky (1997) illustrates how the information present 
at the time of judgment might influence whether or not one is able to accurately 
monitor memory. When Nelson and Dunlosky asked learners to make JOLs with both 
the cue and target present at the time of judgment they did not observe a delayed-JOL 
effect. Presumably, this was because the presence of the target prevented the type of 
monitoring of the memory state that leads to very good accuracy at predicting 
performance. It is possible that this phenomenon alone explains why we did not 
observe an effect of delay for recognition memory in the JOI paradigm. The cue for 
the JOI was the cue alone (BREAD - ?) and not the cue-target pair, but while BREAD 
is the cue for the recall task, it is the target for the recognition task (i.e. the 
recognition task was to press the spacebar when a cue word was displayed in the 
context of the STM list). 
 The presence of the target in the JOI cue may be only a partial explanation of 
the lack of delayed JOI effect. It is also possible that the embedded nature of the PM 
task also contributed to difficulty in monitoring memory for intentions. Although 




used in their PM paradigm, it is not the only type of recognition cue available (or 
used) in real-world PM tasks. Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen and Pallos (2003) say that 
there are many types of PM tasks (e.g., time-based, activity-based, event-based, novel 
or habitual) and there may be just as many types of recognition memory.  
For this series of experiments, I chose to continue using embedded item 
recognition in the JOI paradigm as it is used commonly in laboratory investigations of 
PM and seems to be the most common type of recognition in real-world PM tasks. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine examples of PM tasks that might include 
recognition or forced-choice recognition. However, I altered the JOI cue so that the 
target for recognition was not included to determine if the presence of the recognition 
cue is what caused the lack of delayed JOI effect. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 again used item recognition embedded in a STM task. However, 
this experiment investigated whether the classic delayed JOL effect would occur for 
JOIs when neither the recall nor recognition target was presented in the prompt for 
the judgment. Another important difference between this experiment and the previous 
two is that in this one, the cue to perform the prospective memory task was the time 
displayed on the screen during a STM task rather than the occurrence of a word. 
Method  
Participants. Twenty-five undergraduate students participated as part of a 
course requirement or for extra credit in a course. Two of those participants failed to 




Design. This experiment used a mixed-factors design with timing of judgment 
(immediate or delayed) manipulated within subjects and type of judgment cue 
manipulated between subjects. Judgments were prompted with either a cue-only 
prompt for recall, which included the target for recognition (a JOL-type prompt, e.g., 
“How likely are you to remember to do the prescribed action at the correct time?, 
7:03pm - ?”), or with a cue that included no explicit cue for recall and no target for 
recognition (a JOI-type prompt, e.g. “How likely are you to remember to do the 
prescribed action at the correct time?”). 
Procedure. Participants received both written and oral instructions. One 
paired associate (e.g. 7:03pm – COOK PASTA) was displayed for 2 seconds at the 
beginning of each trial. Participants made their metacognitive judgment either 
immediate after the offset of study of the PM task, or after a 30 second filled delay. 
Delay in this experiment was produced by having participants complete word 
scrambles. For immediate JOLs trials, participants completed the scrambles after both 
study of the PM item and judgment, while for delayed JOL trials they completed the 
scrambles after study of the PM item but before making their judgment.  
After completing the PM study and judgment phase participants completed a 
STM task. They saw several lists of six nouns each at a 2-second rate under 
instructions to study each list in order to remember all the words from each trial. 
After studying each list they were prompted with ???? which was their cue to recall 
the items from the STM list. During the STM task, a fake time was displayed in the 
lower right-hand corner of the computer screen. If they recognized that it was for the 




at which they were supposed to do some task, they then were asked “What are you 
supposed to do at this time?” Additionally, they were asked to recall the time at which 
they were to complete the task. If they pressed the spacebar incorrectly, they were 
shown a screen which read “I am sorry, this is not the time to complete your task.” If, 
after the entire STM task was completed, the participant had not pressed the spacebar 
or had done so, but had only indicated incorrect times, he or she received the prompt 
“What were you supposed to do during this trial?” and also asked to recall the time at 
which he or she was to do it. A total of 20 trials continued in this fashion, each with a 
new PM task for each trial. 
It is important to note that the fake time displayed on the monitor did not 
coincide with the time of day (except perhaps by coincidence) and did not progress at 
the same speed as real time. Within each trial however, it only moved forward at a 
constant rate, though some trials “progressed through time” faster than others. 
 Materials. The learning lists contained paired associates composed of a time 
and a task that was described with a noun and a verb. The STM task contained short 
lists of concrete nouns.  
Results 
Performance on the recognition part of the PM task was scored as a hit if the 
participant pressed the spacebar anytime during the STM list after which the correct 
time had appeared so. 
 Predictive accuracy of judgments. I computed gamma correlations between 
judgments and recognition, recall and PM performance for each participant for both 




An ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgments and recognition 
performance revealed no significant main effect of prompt type (JOL or JOI), a 
borderline-significant effect of judgment timing, F(1, 23) = 3.47, p = .07, and no 
significant interaction. 
An ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgments and performance on 
the recall performance revealed neither significant main effects nor a significant 
interaction.  
An ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgments and performance on 
the entire PM task revealed no significant main effect of prompt type, a borderline-
significant effect of judgment timing, F(1, 23) = 3.67, p = .06, and no significant 
interaction. 
Strangely, the gamma correlations are again out of the range usually observed, 
even for monitoring recall. The only correlation in the expected range is that for 
immediate judgments of the JOL-type. Moreover, there was no delayed-JOL effect 
even for the JOL-type cues. This is an extremely unusual result, as the delayed-JOL 
effect is very robust.  
Experiment 4 
Because of the peculiar gamma correlations in this experiment, I replicated it. 
The excessive length of the session may have caused participants to lose interest in 
the task, thus adversely affecting their ability to provide reasonable JOIs or JOLs. 






 The method for Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 3 except 
that the presentation time for the PM and the STM items was reduced to one second 
and there were only 16 trials. 
 Participants. Forty undergraduate students participated as part of a course 
requirement or for extra credit in a course. Seven of those did not follow instructions 
and I discarded their data. This left 33 participants. 
Results 
 Predictive accuracy of JOIs. I computed gamma correlations between 
judgments and PM performance for each participant for both immediate and delayed 
judgments. The mean gammas are reported in Table 4. Separate ANOVAs examined 
each of the three types of gamma correlation (i.e., between judgment and recognition 
performance, judgment and recall performance and judgment and PM performance).  
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recognition 
performance showed no significant effect of JOL timing or of type, nor a significant 
interaction. 
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recall showed no 
significant effect of judgment timing or type (JOL or JOI), but a borderline-
significant interaction, F(1, 18) = 3.11, p = .09.  Pairwise t-tests showed that for JOL-
type judgments, there was a borderline-significant difference in accuracy for 
immediate as compared to delayed judgments t(8) = 2.25 , p =.05. For JOI-type 




 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and PM performance 
showed a significant interaction, F(1, 23) = 5.32, p < .05, a significant effect of 
judgment timing, F(1, 23) = 4.85, p < .05, and a borderline-significant effect of 
judgment type, F(1, 23) = 3.58, p = .07. Pairwise t-tests showed that for JOL-type 
judgments, there was a significant difference in accuracy for immediate as compared 
to delayed judgments t(11) = 2.86 , p < .05. For JOI-type judgments, this difference 
was not significant, t(12) = .09 , p >.10. 
 Although many of the gamma correlations are still outside the expected range 
the delayed JOL predictions were more accurate than the immediate for both recall 
and PM. This difference did not emerge for the JOI-recognition judgments. These 
results suggest that the increase in accuracy due to delay may be specific to 
retrospective recall tasks and not to prospective memory tasks, and therefore that 
there may be a psychological difference between the two types of tasks.  
 One explanation for the out-of-expected-range gammas is that prediction on 
this time-based task was difficult because the fake time progressed in a way 
participants were not used to, (i.e., more quickly). Although “time” advanced 
monotonically within each trial, it varied between trials (e.g., one trial might start out 
at 11:06am, but the next trial could start at 8:51am), and corresponded to the actual 
time only by chance. Because this is very different from what people are used to 
experiencing in their daily lives, it may increase the difficult of making metacognitive 




It might also be the case that the out-of-expected-range gamma values were 
caused by the time-based (as opposed to event-based) prospective memory task and 
that the fast or fake time was irrelevant.  
Experiment 5 
 It is difficult to interpret the relative accuracy of prediction (as measured by 
gamma) in both Experiment 3 and 4. Thus I designed Experiment 5 as an additional 
attempt to obtain a delayed-JOI effect. Given the possible explanations for the prior 
results, it may make sense to test the accuracy of JOIs in an event-based task. 
However, as there is some debate over the distinction between time- vs. event-based 
tasks (e.g., 4:00 pm can be conceptualized as either a time or an event or even the 
time at which a specific event is scheduled to occur, any of which could trigger recall 
of the intention), this adaptation of the experiment involved an additional trial of the 
time-based paradigm. 
Method  
Participants.  Thirty-four undergraduate students participated to partially 
fulfill a course requirement or for extra credit in a course.  
Design. This design was identical to that in Experiment 4 except that the 
instructions explained fake time in more detail and allowed more trial runs, after 
which there was ample opportunity to ask questions. 
Results 
 Predictive accuracy of judgments. I computed gamma correlations between 
judgments and PM performance for each participant for both immediate and delayed 




each of the three types of correlations (i.e., between judgment and recognition 
performance, judgment and recall performance and judgment and PM performance).  
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recognition 
performance showed no significant effect of judgment type, judgment timing 
(immediate vs. delayed), but a borderline-significant interaction, F(1, 18) = 4.19, p = 
.06. Paired-samples t-tests showed no significant difference between immediate vs. 
delayed judgments for predicting recognition performance when the judgment was 
prompted by a JOL-type cue, t(8) = .41, p > .10, but a significant advantage of 
delayed judgments in predicting recognition performance when the judgment was 
prompted with a JOI-type cue, t(10) = 3.34, p < .05. The t-test comparing gamma 
correlations between JOLs and JOIs made at a delay was non-significant, t(21) = 
1.29, p > .10.  
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recall showed no 
significant effect of judgment timing, or of type of judgment (JOL or JOI), nor a 
significant interaction.   
 Likewise, the ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and PM 
performance showed no significant effect of judgment timing, or of type of judgment, 
nor a significant interaction. 
 It is possible that the lack of significant effects for recognition and recall is 
due to a power problem. A small number of trials for each participant (8 each for 
immediate and delayed judgments) resulted in many ties between judgments, and 
hence, few valid gamma correlations. Pearson r correlations require assumptions 




not testable in the current paradigm and are also based on a small number of 
observations (I discuss this shortcoming of the design in further detail below), so 
while they may overcome gamma’s problem with ties, they may not provide much 
additional information in this analysis. However, it should be noted that Pearson 
correlations between predictive judgments and performance outcomes (see Table 6) 
revealed the identical pattern of results as did gamma correlations.  
Discussion 
 Though virutally none of the results from Experiment 5 are significant they 
never-the-less are informative about whether people are able to make accurate 
metacognitive judgments about PM tasks and whether the delayed-JOL effect also 
occurs for JOIs. 
The correlations between predictive judgments and recognition performance 
must be interpreted in light of the fact that the participants never made predictions 
specifically about the recognition aspect of the test. The difference in correlations for 
JOLs as compared to JOIs suggests that the type of judgment prompt caused the 
participants to incorporate different information in their predictions of performance 
on the target task if they were asked to predict recall as compared to PM. Specifically, 
they appear to be better able to incorporate predictions of recognition performance 
when making JOIs at a delay as evidenced by a significant improvement in accuracy 
if JOI predictions made at a delay, but not of JOLs. Although this experiment does 
not answer the original question in it’s entirety, it provides evidence of different 




 Figure 2 plots the data of Experiment 5. It suggests an interesting relationship 
between judgments of recall and of PM. Though not statistically significant, the trend 
in this figure appears to be for increased predictive accuracy of both JOLs and JOIs 
for their target tasks (those depicted by filled shapes and solid lines) when made at a 
delay following study. The relationship between the JOLs and performance on the 
PM task and between JOIs and performance on the recall task (not the targets of the 
predictions; depicted in unfilled shaped with dashed lines) show overall slightly less 
accurate predictions (not unexpected, since in both cases this is not the aspect of 
performance they were asked to predict), and possibly a different pattern of results for 
JOLs and compared to JOIs. This pattern of correlations between recognition and 
performance suggests that participants attempt to account for predicted performance 
on only the recall aspect of the test when making JOLs and on both the recognition 
and recall aspect of the test when making JOIs. 
 The trends evident in the data from Experiment 5 suggest that individuals are 
able to predict their performance on a PM task and that, as with recall tasks, these 
predictions are more accurate when made at a delay following study of the PM task. 
The next section elaborates the implications of this interpretation in the context of 
results from previous experiments. 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 
 Because some of the difficulty in interpreting the results from experiments 3, 
4 and 5 may have been due in part to a lack of power, the data from these experiments 




methodology used across the three experiments (the specific differences are noted 
above). No trials were excluded from the experiment for the purposes of this analysis. 
Results 
 Predictive accuracy of judgments. I computed gamma correlations between 
judgments and PM performance for each participant for both immediate and delayed 
judgments. The mean gammas are reported in Table 7. Separate ANOVAs examined 
each of the three types of correlations (i.e., between judgment and recognition 
performance, judgment and recall performance and judgment and PM performance).  
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recognition 
performance showed a significant effect of judgment timing (immediate vs. delayed), 
F(1, 57) = 5.41, p < .05. Neither the effect of judgment type nor the interaction was 
significant. 
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and recall showed a 
borderline-significant effect of judgment timing F(1, 64) = 3.52, p = .06. Neither the 
effect of judgment type nor the interaction was significant. 
 The ANOVA for gamma correlations between judgment and PM performance 
showed a significant effect of judgment timing, F(1, 87) = 7.31, p < .05. Neither the 
effect of judgment type nor the interaction was significant. 
 The combined data of these last three experiments shows a consistent pattern 
of more accurate predictions for delayed judgments than for immediate judgments, 
and no consistent difference between JOLs and JOIs.  
 Distribution of judgments. The proportion of correct and incorrect items 




through 5 for recognition, recall and PM, respectively. Note that the distribution of 
judgments was actually the same in all cases (i.e., participants only made one JOL or 
JOI per item), however, performance on the criterion test differs among the figures.  
ANOVAs were computed for each distribution to compare the proportion of 
items assigned a judgment. Separate ANOVAs were computed for items depending 
judgment timing and on whether the item was correct at the criterion test. Judgment 
type (JOL and JOI) and judgment value were treated as between-subjects variables 
because not all participants used all values on the scale. Because of the number of 
unplanned analyses, a Bonferroni correction (α = .0125) was used for each set of 
comparisons to control experiment-wise error.  
For items given immediate judgments and recognized correctly, there was a 
significant effect of judgment value F(5, 283) = 5.50, p <.01, but no significant main 
effect of judgment type. The interaction was also not significant. For items given 
immediate judgments and recognized incorrectly, there were no significant main 
effects nor a significant interaction. For items given delayed judgments and 
recognized correctly, there was a significant effect of judgment value F(5, 297) = 
5.23, p <.01, but no significant main effect of judgment type. The interaction was also 
not significant. Likewise, for items given delayed judgments and recognized 
incorrectly, there were no significant main effects nor a significant interaction. 
For items given immediate judgments and recalled correctly, there was a 
significant effect of judgment value F(5, 304) = 4.59, p <.01, but no significant main 
effect of judgment type. The interaction was also not significant. For items given 




nor a significant interaction. For items given delayed judgments and recalled 
correctly, there was a significant effect of judgment value F(5, 301) = 5.50, p <.01, 
but no significant main effect of judgment type. The interaction was also not 
significant. Likewise, for items given delayed judgments and recalled incorrectly, 
there were no significant main effects nor a significant interaction.  
For items given immediate judgments and correct PM performance, there was 
a significant effect of judgment value F(5, 265) = 3.65, p <.01, but no significant 
main effect of judgment type. The interaction was also not significant. For items 
given immediate judgments and incorrect PM performance, there were no significant 
main effects nor a significant interaction. For items given delayed judgments and 
correct PM performance, there was a significant effect of judgment value F(5, 258) = 
3.68, p <.01, but no significant main effect of judgment type. The interaction was also 
not significant. For items given delayed judgments and incorrect PM performance, 
there were no significant main effects nor a significant interaction.  
Although visual inspection of the distribution curves suggests some small 
differences in the distribution of judgments for JOLs and JOIs, (specifically a 
tendency to use the extremes of the scale when making immediate JOLs for correct 
items), statistical analysis does not bear this out. The only consistent evidence in this 
analysis is that for correct items, proportion of items assigned a particular judgment 
increases with judgment value. This does not obtain for incorrect items. This is to be 
expected and is an indication that participants are able to use the judgment scale when 





The results of these experiments, taken as a whole, suggest that participants 
are able to make moderately accurate predictions of PM performance and that just as 
do traditional JOLs, these predictions may enjoy some increase in accuracy when 
made at a delay rather than immediately following study. However, accurate JOIs 
require a prompt that does not include the recognition target. The first two 
experiments demonstrated no effect of delay for PM judgments, but in both cases 
used a judgment prompt that included the recognition target (e.g.,“BREAD – ?” if 
they were supposed to respond to recognition of the item “BREAD” by pressing the 
letter J). The latter experiments used a judgment prompt that did not include the 
recognition target, and showed a trend toward increased accuracy of both JOIs and 
JOLs when made at a delay following study. 
Prompting a metacognitive judgment of performance on a PM task with a cue 
that includes the recognition target is analogous to asking someone “What are you 
supposed to do at 11am today?” rather than asking them, “Will you remember the 
task(s) you intend to do?” Although the former may seem to be a better memory cue 
as it offers another study trial of the recognition target and provides a rehearsal of 
recall, the later enables the person to ascertain if both the recognition and recall cues 
are in memory, and hence, better predict whether they will be able to remember to do 
both aspects of the PM task. These results suggest that the latter prompt will result in 
a more accurate judgment of performance on the PM task, especially if the judgment 




This series of experiments certainly does not answer all the questions related 
to  metacognition and PM. It was difficult to design an experiment that would allow 
participants to make JOIs for cues in which neither the recognition nor recall target 
are present. Such a task requires a new trial for each item, each with sufficient time to 
allow for possible forgetting of the PM task. Thus, each participant could run only a 
few trials, providing virtually no power to detect any effects. Making judgment 
timing a between-subjects variable is a possible solution, but that eliminates the 
power inherent to a within-subjects manipulation. This problem might be better 
solved by finding a way to have participants study and make judgments for multiple 
cues in a trial. For example, one might have an experiment that includes study, 
followed either by immediate JOI or JOI after a filled delayed, then a judgment 
prompted by a cue that does not include the recognition or recall target, with this 
series repeated for all items in the list before the memory trial begins. The memory 
trial itself would then contain multiple recognition targets to which participants 
should respond be recalling the appropriate task or response. This solution introduces 
another type of variance into the design however, as participants must then make 
judgments all at once for events or cues that may occur many minutes apart. One 
might argue that this is often how we make PM judgments in daily life, but it is a 
significant departure from the usual laboratory paradigm for JOLs in which 
judgments and test are made in blocks to minimize difference in time for each item 
between judgment and test. 
Another puzzling outcome in this series of experiments is failure to find 




this failure is that Experiments 3 – 5 utilized a time-based PM paradigm. As noted 
previously, there is some discussion in the literature regarding whether time- vs. 
event-based tasks exist on a continuum or constitute a sharp distinction. There are 
persuasive arguments for the idea of a continuum, but also some empirical evidence 
that performance differs on the two types of PM tasks, (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & 
Giles, 2001; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell and Mayhorn, 1997). The delayed-JOL 
effect may be more difficult to obtain in the time-based paradigm, which may in turn 
make a time-based task a less than ideal context in which to test the hypothesis of a 
delayed-JOI effect. It is possible to adapt the current paradigm to use the occurrence 
of a particular number or letter in the display to replace the advancing fake time as the 
recognition target. However, the similarity of a changing number or word to the 
advancing time highlights the fuzzy distinction between time- and event-based PM 
tasks.  
The final three experiments differed from the first two in another possibly 
important way. In the first two experiments the PM was embedded in the STM task in 
a manner such that some of the STM items were the recognition cues for the PM task. 
In the latter three experiments, the cues for the PM task were extraneous to the STM 
task and occurred in the form of a changing time display on the screen. It is possible 
that this difference also contributed to the lack of evidence for a delayed-JOI effect in 
the first two experiments. This hypothesis could be tested by comparing PM 
performance when the recognition cue is part of vs. extraneous to the task in which it 
is embedded. This design has a real-world parallel in that we sometimes engage in 




task (e.g., grading a student’s paper may remind one of an appointment with that 
individual), while in other tasks the recognition target may be extraneous to the task 
(e.g., a different student’s paper may not remind us of the appointment, or the time of 
day may be extraneous to the task even though we intended it to act as a recognition 
target for the appointment).  
It is possible that the performance differences on event- vs. time-based PM 
tasks is actually due to a difference in embedded vs. extraneous recognition cues. 
Although it is difficult to imagine a time-based cue that is embedded in the task (i.e., 
most people must look at the clock to know the exact time) it is easy to think of 
examples in which recognition cues are embedded in time-based tasks, either by 
chance (the paper by the student happens to remind you of the appointment) or by 
design (you intend to use the supermarket billboard on your way home as a reminder 
to buy bread). It may be the case that time-based cues are more likely to be 
extraneous to the task, while event-based cues may be embedded in the task on which 
attention is already focused.  
A final possibility for the difficulty in obtaining the delayed-JOL effect may 
be that because PM tasks occur during some other on-going activity (the STM task in 
this case), the on-going activity distracts from the recall aspect, or represents a more 
complex task overall, which may make the delayed-JOL effect more difficult to 
obtain. This may be because participants are not able to mentally instantiate the 
context of the on-going task when making their metacognitive judgments. Although 




embarrassment, having to re-schedule), in this paradigm there is no real cost to failing 
to recognize the recognition cue or failing to recall the correct response.  
One issue that future work on metacognition and PM may focus on is the role 
of costs in forming of PM cues. It is neither possible nor practical to create external 
cues for all intentions that we create throughout the day, and nearly as impossible to 
create and retain internal cues for all intentions. To determine how to best allocate 
memory and attention resources, it is important to be able to judge which intentions 
require cues and which are sufficiently likely to be recalled without specific cues 
(possibly because of reliance on habit or belief that idiosyncratic cues will provide 
sufficient reminders). It is important to determine both how well people judge which 
items will require an external cue and how people factor in costs (either in terms of 
the energy required to create the cue or the consequences if the PM task is forgotten) 
when deciding whether or not to form an external PM cue for a particular item. 
Although such costs are not intrinsic in the laboratory paradigm, they could be 
included by tying costs and pay-offs to task performance. 
Other questions might address whether predictive accuracy is improved when 
learners formulate their own PM cues (as compared to those produced by the 
experimenter) and whether other features of the judgment prompt affect the accuracy 
of PM judgments. This question also has important implications for everyday PM 
performance as we sometimes are given external PM cues (e.g., someone adds 
something to our calendar, or asks us to pick up bread at the grocery store), and other 




whether an assigned cue is a good onr for them (and therefore rely on it) or a poor 
cue, in which case they might reinforce it by forming their own.  
It is clear that we rely on memory for intentions in order to get through our 
days in both work and personal life. Although little work to date has focused on the 
accuracy of metacognitions about intention memory, one’s functioning in the world 
often relies on whether one will remember an intended task. There is considerable 
work to be done in determining the circumstances under which people can best make 
predictions about intentions. Addressing these issues will further our understanding of 





1. Note that the degrees of freedom reported in this analysis are lower than might be 
expected given the number of participants. This is because not all participants 
contributed gamma correlations to the analysis because of tied judgments or memory 






Experiment 1- Proportion correct (and standard errors) for the PM and STM tasks 
 JOL timing
 Immediate (n = 18) Delayed (n = 16)
 3 items 6 items 3 items 6 items 
PM memory (hits) 
 
.32 (.07) .33 (.08) .46 (.07) .50 (.08) 
Proportion correct 
on STM target 
trials 
.93 (.03) .67 (.03) .94 (.02) .71 (.03) 
Proportion correct 
on STM lure trials 





Experiment 2 – Mean gamma correlations (and standard errors) between judgments 
and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the combined (recognition + 
recall) PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition













g(JOI, recog) .31 (.05) .37 (.05) .02 (.04) .17 (.05) -.28 (.06) .25 (.07) 
g(JOI, recall) .28 (.05) .40 (.04) .33 (.04) .86 (.04) .41 (.06) .75 (.05) 
g(JOI, PM) .37 (.04) .53 (.04) -.02 (.04) .52 (.04) -.16 (.06) .49 (.07) 






Experiment 3 - Mean gamma correlations (and standard errors) between judgments 
and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition









g(JOL, recog) .03 (.19) .12 (.22) -.11 (.19) .28 (.18) 
g(JOL, recall) .39 (.17) .02 (.19) -.27 (.20) -.22 (.18) 
g(JOL, PM) .21 (.22) .29 (.18) -.14 (.21) .37 (.19) 





Experiment 4 - Mean gamma correlations (and standard errors) between judgments 
and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition









g(JOL, recog) -.37 (.21) .17 (.24) .47 (.25) .54 (.25) 
g(JOL, recall) -.02 (.29) .62 (.16) .39 (.22) .39 (.17) 
g(JOL, PM) -.39 (.21) .43 (.22) .37 (.17) .50 (.18) 





Experiment 5 - Mean gamma correlations (and standard errors) between judgments 
and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition









g(JOL, recog) .35 (.15) .19 (.25) .07 (.19) .55 (.15) 
g(JOL, recall) .30 (.30) .47 (.16) .00 (.21) .19 (.14) 
g(JOL, PM) .27 (.17) .29 (.15) .17 (.16) .37 (.14) 





Experiment 5 – Mean Pearson r correlations (and standard errors) between 
judgments and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition









g(JOL, recog) .39 (.10) .25 (.15) .00 (.15) .40 (.10) 
g(JOL, recall) .14 (.17) .24 (.10) .03 (.10) .14 (.08) 
g(JOL, PM) .25 (.09) .25 (.09) .10 (.09) .23 (.08) 





Experiments 3, 4 and 5 - Mean gamma correlations (and standard errors) between 
judgments and performance on each aspect of the PM task and the PM task. 
 Monitoring Condition









g(JOL, recog) .03 (.11) .27 (.12) .12 (.12) .43 (.11) 
g(JOL, recall) .16 (.15) .41 (.11) .06 (.12) .28 (.09) 
g(JOL, PM) -.01 (.11) .33 (.10) .11 (.10) .41 (.09) 





Figure 1. Illustration of metacognitive judgments in a JOL paradigm as compared to a 
JOI paradigm. 
 
Figure 2. Gamma correlations between judgment and recall and judgment and 
between PM for both JOL- and JOI-type judgment prompts for Experiment 5. 
Correlations between judgments and the target tasks are depicted by filled shapes and 
solid lines. The correlations between the JOLs and performance on the PM task and 
between JOIs and performance on the recall task (not the targets of the predictions) 
are depicted in unfilled shaped with dashed lines. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of judgments for immediate and delayed judgments for each 
judgment value based on whether or not the item was recognized at test. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of judgments for immediate and delayed judgments for each 
judgment value based on whether or not the item was recalled at test. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of judgments for immediate and delayed judgments for each 
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